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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, . . 
Plaintiff-Respondent, . • 
-v- . Case No. 18165 . 
RICHARD A. RICCI, . . 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with committing the crime of 
Burglary of a Non-dwelling in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 
76-6-202. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him 
guilty of Burglary of a Non-dwelling on November 17, 1981 in 
the District Court 1n and for Carbon County, the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell presiding. The court pronounced judgment at that 
time and sentenced appellant to imprisonment for a term not to 
exceed five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered at the trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged with burglarizing a bar named 
the BEJO on October 11, 1981, at approximately 4:00 a.rn. 
Although appellant was a patron of the bar during 
the evening of October 10 (T. 80), the barmaid saw him at a 
pay telephone booth outside the bar after she had closed, 
locked up and left for the night (T. 82, 85). 
The next morning at about 4:00 a.m., a police 
officer discovered appellant walking out of the rear door of 
the BEJO (T. 26). Other officers arrived and entered the bar 
with the appellant (T. 45). Since the doqr was jammed, the 
officer had to enter sideways (T. 45). As he did so, he 
kicked the broken back door lock which was on the ground {T. 
46, 47). At that time the only illumination was from the 
clock lights on the bar because the main lights were off (T. 
49). The officer looked toward the front of the bar and saw 
that the front of the cigarette machine had been removed (T. 
48). 
The officers also entered the bar and appellant 
stated "I guess I'm in trouble now" (T. 28). An officer read 
the Miranda warnings (T. 28) to appellant, frisked him (T. 
28), and seated him in the bar (T. 30). The officer found a 
knife in appellant's sock {T. 27) and a screwdriver without a 
handle in his pocket (T. 28). 
-2-
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An officer summoned the bar owner (T. 60). Upon 
arrival, the owner asked appellant "Why did you do this to 
me?" (T 61) 
• • He replied "I don't know. I'm sorry. But 
everything you own is in this trashcan" {T. 62). Prior to 
appellant's statement, the officers had not discussed the 
contents of the trashcan in his presence (T. 73). 
The juke box (T. 48), change machine (T. 51) and 
safe (T. 49, 25) had been broken into. As the officers 
prepared to take fingerprints from the machines, appellant 
stated "It won't do you no good. You won't get any." 
The officer who searched appellant (T. 28, 29) 
placed the knife and screwdriver in the evidence room at the 
police department (T. 29). Contrary to the inference made in 
appellant's brief, the officer also made an inventory of the 
trashcan's contents and placed the can and its contents in the 
evidence room (T. 31, 32). The officer locked those items 
·) 
•th h' w i __ 1s own personal lock and key (T. 32). The inventory of 
the can's contents included over $250 in coins (T. 32), a claw 
hammer (T. 31), and food (T. 34). The inventory list was 
received as evidence at trial, without objection {T. 33, 34). 
The court also admitted the can's contents into 
evidence at trial after a police officer testified that the 
contents were the same (T. 34) as those he found, sealed and 
marked as evidence. 
-3-
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After appellant was taken to the police station, 
Officer Semken advised him of his rights (T. 89) and asked him 
if he understood them (T. 90). The appellant said that he did 
(T. 90). Then the officer asked appellant "What happened over 
in Helper?" The appellant answered "I got caught." He 
further stated that he had hidden in the bar after closing, 
had seen the officer making door checks and so had locked the 
bar's rear door and then emerged from the bar after the 
officer had continued down the alley (T. 90, 91). 
However, this testimony was controverted at trial 
when appellant testified he had merely entered the bar in 
search of a drink in the early morning because he thought the 
bar was open (T. 104). Also, the barmaid had testified that 
she saw appellant outside the bar after she had locked up and 
left (T. 82, 85). She also testified that it would have been 
impossible for appellant to hide in the location he had 
claimed earlier 1T. 95). 
Appellant was convicted of another burglary, a 
felony, in 1973 (T. 110, 115). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE 
INFORMATION. 
Appellant contends in Point II of his brief that the 
amendment to the information prejudiced his substantial 
rights. 
-4-
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Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-4(b) provides that an 
information can charge an offense by its common law name, 
s ta tu tory name, or by definition. Under any of the three 
methods, the purpose remains the same: to give the defendant 
sufficient notice of the charge. In this case, the charge was 
Burglary of a Non-dwelling, an offense which can be committed 
by two methods. When a defendant requires further details to 
defend a charge, he or she should file a Bill of Particulars 
as set forth in Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-35-4(3). In this case, 
appellant was charged by statute name (R. 1). If he was 
unsure as to whether both methods were included in the charge, 
he should have filed a Bill of Particulars. State v. Martin, 
463 P.2d 63 (Ariz. 1970); State v. Wilson, Utah, 642 P.2d 394 
(1982). However, since an offense can be charged merely by 
statutory name, the original information was adequate to give 
appellant notice of the charge sufficient to prepare his 
defense. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-4 permits an information to 
be amended if no additional or different offense is charged 
and the defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced. In 
/ 
this case, the amendment did not charge· an additional or 
different offense. The charge remained Burglary of a Non-
dwelling. The amendment merely pertained to the methods of 
committing the crime and was not a change in the offense 
itself. 
-5-
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Appellant contends that his substantial rights were 
prejudiced. For the amendment to be prejudicial, however, it 
must alter defenses, evidence, or the potential sentence. 
People v. White, 176 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1970); State v. Smith, 
594 P.2d 218 (Kan. 1979). In State v. Rohletter, 108 Utah 
452, 160 P.2d 963 {1945) the Court found that defendant's 
rights were prejudiced when an information charging rape was 
amended to include a different offense, carnal knowledge. The 
amendment in that case was prejudicial because the defense of 
consent to the rape charge was unavailable to defend the 
carnal knowledge charge. 
In the present case, as distinguished from 
Rohletter, supra, the same defense is available to both the 
original and amended informations. Appellant's defense is 
that he allegedly thought the bar was open and entered as a 
potential patron~(T. 104). When he realized the bar was not 
open, he allegedly planned to leave. Before doing so, 
however, he stuck his head out the door and saw a police 
officer (T. 107). 
Appellant's testimony, if believ~d by the jury, 
would have been a defense to the amended information as well 
as to the original information. If appellant had entered 
believing the bar was open and had left when he realized the 
bar was closed, he could not have been guilty of u,lawfully 
-6-
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remaining in the bar. Thus, h.is defense, if believed, was 
applicable to both the original and amended informations. 
The evidence presented was also applicable to both 
informations. The knife and screwdriver fauna in appellant's 
possession (T. 28, 29), the concentration of coins into one 
place (T. 28), and the fact it was about 4:00 a.m. (T. 26, 27) 
indicate that appellant did not lawfully enter the bar. Even 
if appellant had entered the bar believing it was open, those 
facts also indicate appellant did not lawfully remain in the 
bar. It is unlikely that another party would have burglarized 
the bar and left the money behind. Appellant indicated to the 
bar owner that he knew what the can contained (T. 61), 
although none of the officers had mentioned the contents in 
his ·presence (T. 72) (Appellant stated "But everything you own 
is in this trash can" (T. 61)). Thus, the very evidence that 
shows appellant entered the bar unlawfully with the intent to 
commit a theft also shows appellant did not lawfully remain in 
the bar. State v. Lamb, 530 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1974); State v. 
White, 608 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1980). 
In addition to the same defense and evidence, the 
/ 
potential sentence does not change for .either entering or 
remaining with intent to commit a theft. 
Appellant fails to show how his reliance on the 
original information for notice was crucial to his defense 
since he actually raised the issue of remaining unlawfully. 
-7-
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In cross examining a police officer, appellant's counsel asked 
"Isn't it true, Mr. Atwood, that Mr. Ricci, at the time you 
were rattling the doors, came to the door after you had 
rattled it? 11 (T. 38). Appellant's question raises the 
possibility that he remained unlawfully in the bar until an 
officer came to the back door rather than attempting to leave 
as soon as he saw that the bar had been burglarized. 
Although Officer Semken testified that appellant 
confessed to hiding in the bar at closing time (T. 90, 93), 
appellant's counsel had questioned the barmaid and established 
that she saw appellant outside the bar as she left (T. 85). 
Thus it is clear that appellant was aware that the charge of 
Burglary of a Non-dwelling included "entering or remaining in" 
with intent to commit a theft. 
In State v. Warfield, 507 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. App. 
1974), the information charged stealing without the owner's 
consent (defendant exchanged rolls of coins containing washers 
and slugs for dollars). On the day of the trial, the state 
amended the information to allege stealing by deceit. The 
Missouri court thought defendant's substantial rights were not 
/ 
prejudiced because the statute merely p~ovided two methods for 
stealing, either without the owner's consent or by means of 
deceit. The offense remained the same. In the present case, 
entering or remaining are the two methods provided in the 
statute for Burglary, but the offense remains the same. 
-8-
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The Arizona court, in State v. Williams, 499 P.2d 
97, 102 (Ariz. 1972), fashioned a different test: "ask 
whether an acquittal as to the amended charge would be a 
defense to the original." In the present case, if appellant 
had been acquitted on the amended information, he obviously 
had a valid defense to the original information. 
Respondent contends that the amendment did not 
prejudice appellant's substantial rights because the same 
offense was charged, the same defense and evidence pertained, 
and by appellant's counsel's questions at trial, it was clear 
that appellant was aware of the charge and the two methods of 
committing it. 
Even if the trial court should not have allowed the 
amendment to the information, the amendment was harmless 
error. The information was sufficient in charging the crime 
by name alone. The amendment may have been unnecessary but 
did not result in error. State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 
717 (1922). 
Although appellant initially confessed and claimed 
to have hidden in the bar, this testimony was not supported by 
/ 
the facts. Appellant claimed he saw the police coming and 
locked the door before the officer checked it (T. 90). This 
was clearly impossible since the lock was broken and on the 
ground (T. 52). The officer testified he did not check the 
door, but rather saw appellant before he even reached the 
-9-
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door (T. 26). The barmaid testified she saw appellant outside 
the bar after she left (T. 82). Further, the bar had been 
broken into, and the burglary proceeds were still there (T. 
32). Thus, even if the trial court errea in allowing the 
state to amend the information, the amendment was harmless 
error because appellant's confession raisea no real "remaining 
in" issue. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIVING JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4. 
In Point III of his brief, appellant claims jury 
instruction 4 should not have been given because it included 
the "or remaining in" language. Jury instruction 4 states the 
statutory requirements of Burglary of a Non-dwelling: 
Before you can convict the defendant 
of burglary, as charged in the 
Information, you must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt the following elements: 
1. That the defendant, on or about 
October 11, 1981, unlawfully entered or 
remained in a building of another. 
2. That at the time of such entry or 
unlawfully remaining he had the intent to 
commit a theft. 
If you believe that the evidence 
establishes each of these essential 
elements of the oifense of burglary beyond 
a reasonable doubt it is your duty to 
convict the defendant of the crime of 
burglary as stated in the Information. 
-10-
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If the evidence has failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or 
more of the said elements, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty of the crime 
of burglary as charged in the Information. 
This instruction differed from appellant's requested 
version in that the court added the "or remaine<l in" language. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-30(b) provides that "errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time •. " The court corrected appellant's • 
requested instruction to include both unlawful entry or 
remaining because both methods are included in the definition 
of Burglary. 
This instruction did not prejudice appellant's 
substantial rights for the same reasons delineated in Point I 
above. In addition, this Court has held that it is not error 
to instruct according to statutory terms when the evidence (as 
discussed in Point I in this case) justifies the instruction. 
State v. Minnish, Utah, 560 P.2d 340 (1977); State v. Starks, 
Utah , 6 2 7 P • 2 d 8 8 ( 1 9 81 ) • 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
/ 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
4. 
utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202 (1953) defines the crime 
of Burglary as unlawfully entering or remaining in a building 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or portion of a building with intent to commit a felony, theft 
or assault. Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-201 defines when a person 
enters or remains unlawfully as "when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of entry or remaining are not open 
to the public. " • • • 
Appellant contends in Point I of his brief that his 
version of what "open to the public'' means should have been 
given as an instruction to the jury. Appellant's requested 
instruction is not the law in Utah ana therefore should not 
have been given. State v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263 (Idaho 
1973). The Utah Legislature, in setting forth the 
requirements for burglary, merely stated that the building not 
be open to the public. Respondent contends that basing the 
lawfulness of an entry on the defendant's subjective belief as 
to whether a building is open would effectively repeal the 
burglary statute. Very few defendants would admit that they 
believed that a building was closed to the public, and proof 
of such through other evidence would be almost impossible. 
To prove an unlawful entry or remaining, respondent 
must only show that the premises were not open to the public, 
and that appellant did not have consent or a license from the 
owner. 
In Commonwealth v. Cost, 362 A.2d 1027 (Penn. 1976), 
the court, using a burglary statute similar to Utah's, 
required that the state prove the premises were not open to 
-12-
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the public. The state did not .have to prove defendant could 
not have thought the premises were open to the public. In the 
present case the state has met its burden of showing the bar 
was not open since the barmaid testified she had closed the 
bar ( T. 83) • 
While appellant was entitled to present his theory 
of the case to the jury, there was no basis in the evidence to 
support the requested jury instruction in this case. In 
several Utah cases with somewhat similar facts, the defendant 
was denied a proposed jury instruction on his "theory of the 
case" because it was not supported by any substantial 
evidence. State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 
(1969); State v. Dock, Utah, 585 P.2d 56 (1978); State v. 
Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261 (1980); State v. Asav, Utah, 631 
P.2d 861 (1981). This Court did not focus on the defendant's 
subjective belief of reasonableness in these cases, but rather 
·i 
looked at the evidence and concluded it was too slight to 
raise a reasonable doubt. 
In the present case, the evidence is also too slight 
to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant could 
/ 
believe the bar was open. Appellant did ~ot use the front 
door, which would be the normal entrance. Instead, he entered 
through the back door, located in a dark alley (T. 26). The 
rear door wouldn't open properly but rather was jammed open to 
a point that the police officer could only enter sideways 
-13-
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(T. 45). As the officer entered, he kicked the door lock 
which was on the floor (T. 46, 47). The bar was dark; the 
main lights were off (T. 84). The only lights on were tiny 
bar clock lights (T. 84). When one officer entered, he looked 
to the front of the bar and could immediately see that a 
machine had been broken into (T. 48). It was approximately 
4:00 a.m. (T. 26), a time when no business in Helper would be 
open. There was no normal activity, no employees or patrons, 
and no noise in the bar which could lead appellant to think 
the bar was open. These facts clearly refute appellant's 
theory. Perhaps if he had entered through a front door the 
story might appear to be more believable, but in viewing the 
facts in their totality, no evidence supports the requested 
Jury instruction. 
In Commonweal.th v. Tilman, 417 A.2d 717 (Penn. 
1979), the-court decided that a car dealership was open to the 
public because the state had failed to show that the 
dealership was not open. The defendant was seen in the 
building fifteen minutes before opening time, the building was 
not shown to be locked, the lights were on, and an employee 
even thought defendant was a customer. 
In the present case, the time was not near opening 
or closing, the lights were off, the door could only be 
partially opened, and no employees were present. Thus, 
respondent contends no reasonable person could have found 
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that the bar was open. When a .story such as appellant's is so 
fanciful, it does not warrant a jury instruction on his 
theory. State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 
(1971); People v. Truesdale, 546 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1976); State 
v. Dock, supra. 
In State v. Vasquez, 492 P.2d 1005 (N.M. 1971), the 
court refused to ·give the defendant's requested jury 
instruction on excusable killing because the evidence did not 
support a theory of accident or provocation. The court felt 
that the instruction injected a false issue into the case. 
Respondent contends that in the present case, appellant's 
requested instruction would also inject a false issue into the 
case. If the jury h~d believed appellant's testimony, it 
would have acquitted him because he lacked the requisite 
intent to commit burglary. Since his testimony was not 
believed, and he entered the bar when it was not open, the 
jury correctly convicted appellant. Since the evidence 
overwhelmingly pointed to the fact the bar was closed, such an 
instruction was unmerited. 
Appellant cites State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499 
/ {Oregon 1974), for the proposition that whether a person could 
think a building is open to the public is a Jury question. In 
Taylor, the reasonableness of defendant's belief was a much 
closer factual question. That case involved a laundry room in 
an apartment complex, which conceivably could be open all the 
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time so that tenants could do laundry. The present case 
involves a business entity with clearly defined hours {T. 64}. 
In the Taylor case, the defendant would not necessarily expect 
any activity in the laundromat--the room would be quiet and 
deserted unless someone happened to be using the machines. In 
this case, any patron of a bar would expect some activity, 
noise, employees and customers whenever he entered. 
In the Taylor case, the lights shown outside the 
laundry room, the defendant used the normal entrance and there 
was no sign outside the facility limiting the room to tenants 
only at specific times. Thus defendant's testimony was more 
plausible and warranted a jury instruction on his theory. In 
this case there were no lights on outside the bar, the 
appellant did not use the normal entrance and the business 
normally closed at 1:00 a.m. Therefore, no jury-=instruct-ion 
was warranted on appellant's theory. 
Even if the instruction should have been given, 
respondent contends that the error was harmless for three 
reasons. First, the bu~gl2ry statute, the terms cf which were 
set forth in instruction number 4, is not unclear. 
Instruct ion nurnbe r 5 def in es unlawful ent.r-y as occurring when 
the building is not open to the public. Appellant claims that 
if the jury is not instructed on reasonable belief as to 
whether a building is open, "any entry, regardless of the 
aJpearance of the business, is unlawful if the management 
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had intended that it be closed." While the Utah Legislature 
did not define "open to the public," the phrase is clear and 
easy to interpret under each fact situation. Whether a 
building is open depends on the extrinsic facts (i.e., 
unlocked, lights on, close to opening time), not on either 
defendant's or management's subjective belief. 
Second, the jury instructions, taken as a whole, 
require the jury to consider all the evidence, including 
defendant's testimony. Thus, if the jury believed appellant's 
testimony, it would have acquitted him despite the fact that 
the bar was not technically open to the public because he 
would not have had the requisite intent. 
Third, even if the jury believed that appellant 
entered the bar thinking it was open, his defense becomes 
irrelevant· because he - remained inside unlawfully. See Point 
I. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. 
In Point V of his brief, appellant contends his 
/ 
confession was not an implied waiver of his right to remain 
silent. Al though appellant admits he understood his "Miranda 
rights," he claims he did not waive his right to remain 
silent. Respondent contends that appellant's voluntary 
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confession, made when he was aware and knowledgeable of his 
rights, was an effective waiver. 
The Supreme Court, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973), looked at the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine that consent to a search was 
voluntary. Thus, the Court considered the defendant's age, 
education, intelligence, lack of advice on rights, length of 
detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged 
and whether physical punishment was used. The defendant's 
maturity and intelligence were factors considered in Frazier 
v • Cu pp , 3 9 4 U. S • 7 31 ( 19 6 9 ) • 
This Court, 1n State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 
P.2d 302 (1973), thought the question of whether a statement 
was voluntary should be determined from all the evidence 
produced by both sides. 
In this case, the only evidence to support 
appellant's contention is that appellant, before he spoke, did 
not expressly say that he wished to freely speak (T. 90). 
Justice Powell, in Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. 648 (1976), felt 
that it was relevant that the defendant in that case failed to 
claim the privilege of silence. 
In considering the totality of the circumstances, 
the evidence supports respondent's contention that the waiver 
was voluntary. At trial, appellant displayed no educational 
deficiencies. He was a mature adult (T. 99), of presumably 
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normal intelligence. He, in fact, was capable of working as a 
skilled craftsman--a carpenter (T. 99). He spoke fluent 
English. He did not confess under duress after lengthy 
questioning. In fact, he answered Officer Semken's first 
question (T. 90). He had a prior felony conviction and thus 
was no novice in these matters. When appellant was thirsty, 
the officer supplied him with soft drinks (T. 92). The 
circumstances surrounding appellant's confession present no 
suggestion that the confession was coerced. 
In State v. Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 
832 (1970), the defendant robbed a store and accidentally shot 
himself. When the police found him, he was in great pain. 
The officer read him his rights and the defendant said he did 
not wish to talk. Then the officer asked him why he committed 
the robbery. The defendant's incriminating answer was 
admitted into evidence although he claimed the state failed to 
•( 
affirmatively show that he waived his right to remain silent. 
This Court stated: 
The fact that he made the statement after 
being warned is a clear indication that he 
waived any right, if any he had, to remain 
si1ent. / 
Respondent contends the present case clearly comes 
within the scope of Moraine, supra. In that case, the 
defendant was in great pain and had expressly said he did not 
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w is h to talk . In this case, the defendant was not suffering 
from any mental or physical pain and had expressed no desire 
to remain silent. His confession was free and voluntary, made 
under ideal circumstances. 
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 
(1977) concerned a defendant making a similar claim. Chief 
Justice Burger, in writing for the Court, statea: 
Inaeed, it seems self-evident that one who 
is told he is free to ref use to answer 
questions is in a curious posture to later 
complain that his answers were compelled. 
In State v. Winkle, Utah, 535 P.2d 82, 83 (1975), an 
issue was whether the defendant voluntarily waived his rights. 
This Court statea: 
The question thus posed is whether the 
defenaant, in awareness of his rights, and 
in circumstances where he was free to 
choose, knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to remain silent and to have 
counsel. It is both the prerogative and 
the du1ty of the trial court to make that 
determination (emphasis added). 
In this case the court, after hearing Officer Semken's 
testimony on the circumstances surrounding the confession, 
decided the confession was aarnissible because the appellant 
had waived his right to remain silent. The trial court was in 
the best position to view the facts and aeter~ine that 
appellant's confession was voluntary. The evidence, viewed as 
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a whole, supports the trial court's view that appellant 
understood his rights and knowingly waived the right to remain 
silent. Since appellant has failed to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion, the finding of waiver should be 
upheld. State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956); 
State v. Meinhart, Utah, 617 P.2d 355 (1980). 
Respondent contends that even if the confession 
should have been suppressed, its admission into evidence was 
not harmful error. The evidence presented at trial, in 
addition to appellant's confession, was sufficient to sustain 
the conviction. Appellant was caught exiting through the 
bar's back door (T. 26). The burglary proceeds were in 
appellant's control (T. 31). The appellant told the police 
they would not find fingerprints (T. 51), a fact which 
certainly infers guilty knowledge. When asked by the bar 
owner why he had~committed the crime, appellant stated "I 
don't know. I'm sorry. But everything you own is in this 
trash can" (T. 61). With this evidence of guilt, appellant's 
confession was unnecessary to sustain his conviction. 
Cottrell v. State, 458 P.2d 328 (Okla. Cir. 1969); State v. 
/ 
Ayers, 518 P.2d 190 (Oregon 1973). 
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POINT V 
THE CONTENTS OF A TRASH BUCKET WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
In Point IV of his brief, appellant claims that the 
contents of a trash can should not have been admitted into 
evidence for two reasons. First, that the officer failed to 
testify that the contents of the can were in the same 
condition as at the time the offense occurred. Second, that 
the contents should have been individually identified. 
Respondent contends that the contents of the trash 
bucket were properly admitted and that appellant's contentions 
are without merit. 
In this case, the contents of the trash bucket were 
introduced into evidence to show appellant's intent and to 
allow ~n inference of his unlawful entry or remaining. 
Whether a few coins were missing or added is immaterial 
because the evidence was not introduced to prove the exact 
contents of the trash bucket. 
If appellant was charged with theft instead of 
burglary, the exact value of the can's contents would be 
/ 
important because it would determine the ~egree of the offense 
under Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-412. Appellant was charged with 
burglary, for which the offense and sentence remains the same 
regardless of how much was taken. 
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Although it would not matter in this case if the 
evidence was not exactly as it was at the time of the crime, 
appellant contends that the state had to meet the test set 
forth in Carter v. State, 446 P.2d 165 (Nevada 1968). That 
Court required that the evidence be identical and in the same 
condition. This Court has set its own standard which differs 
from the Nevada test. 
In State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670, 
672 (1972), this Court held that to be admissible in evidence, 
an object must be shown to be "in substantially the same 
condition as at the time of a crime." In determining whether 
evidence is admissible, this Court considers the circumstances 
of preservation and custody of the item and the possibility of 
tampering occurring. 
If after consideration of these 
factors the trial court is satisfied that 
the article or substance has not been 
changed or altered, he [sic] may permit 
its ititroduction into evidence. While it 
is the duty of the court to make the first 
determination, the jury may disregard the 
evidence shoulo they determine the custody 
of the article or substance has not been 
sufficiently shown, or that it has been 
altered or changed. 
The standard set forth in Madsen, supra, was applied 
in state v. Eagle Book, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 73, 75 (1978). 
The witnesses in the case who had purchased the pornography 
and submitted it to the county attorney could only testify 
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that the covers on the magazines in question were the same. 
They were unable to say whether the magazines' contents were 
the same because they had failed to examine the contents at 
any time. This Court, in following Madsen, admitted the 
magazines into evidence despite the fact the witnesses could 
not say the contents were in the same condition as when 
purchased. This Court stated: 
Once in the hands of the County Attorney, 
it is generally presumed that the exhibits 
were handled with regularity, absent an 
affirmative showing of bad faith or actual 
tampering. At trial, the exhibits were 
identified by the purchasers by the 
materials' outer covers and the 
purchasers' markings although it could not 
unequivocally be said that the material 
was identical page for page as when 
earlier purchased. (emphasis added) 
In that case, the magazines' contents were extremely important 
to the defendant because the offense depended upon whether the 
contents were pornographic and thus whether alteration 
occurred was relevant. In the present case, the can's 
contents are not that important because the offense of 
burglary does not hinge on the amount and value of coins (or 
other proceeds) found at the scene. 
In Eagle, the evidence was admissible because the 
likelihood of tampering was remote and the chain of custody 
was established. In this case, the chain of custody has been 
established through the officer's testimony and the likelihood 
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of tampering is remote. The officer took the can and 
contents, made an inventory, and kept the evidence locked up 
(T. 31, 32). Thus, the trial court was correct in admitting 
the evidence. State v. Crook, 565 P.2d 576, 577 (Idaho 1977); 
State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Arizona 1978); People v. 
Roybal, 609 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1979). 
In this case the chain of custody was established. 
Even when the chain is defective, it affects the weight, not 
the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Carney, 533 P.2d 
1268 (Kansas 1975). 
Appellant also claims that each item in the waste 
can should have been initialed to insure that the inventory 
list corresponded with the exhibit at trial. However, this 
procedure is impractical and unnecessary. At trial, the 
custodial officer testified that the exhibit was the same 
trash can with the same contents that he found at the scene of 
·/ 
the crime (T. 34). "This is everything that I found and 
sealed and marked as evidence" {T. 34). "It's all in there" 
(T. 34). In viewing the testimony, it appears that the 
contents of the can remained the same. Appellant has failed 
to support his bald assertion that the contents might be 
different, nor has he shown what harm he would have suffered 
if the contents were somewhat different. 
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It is not necessary to mark each individual coin, 
even in a theft case where the exact amount is important to 
determine the charge. State v. McGonigle, 440 P.2d 100 
(Arizona 1968); State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103 
(1980). Marking each coin would serve no useful purpose. In 
this case, the inventory was made to insure that the bar owner 
received the stolen money after appellant's trial was over. 
Merely totaling the amount of coins was adequate to serve that 
purpose. 
In addition to the bucket and contents, appellant's 
confession, the police officer's and bar ~wner's testimony, 
and the inventory list, all showed that the proceeds of the 
burglary were still on the premises when appellant was 
arrested. This evidence--and not the exact or unaltered 
amount taken--was sufficient to allow the jury to infer 
appellant's intent to commit a theft in the BEJO. The 
admission of the bucket and its contents merely confirmed the 
testimony of the presence of the bucket at the scene, allowing 
the inference of intent, and was not intended to prove the 
contents of the bucket. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, respondent contends that appellant's 
rights were not prejudiced by the amendment to the 
information; that the jury instruction defining burglary in 
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statutory terms was proper; that appellant's requested jury 
instruction was correctly refused; that appellant waived his 
right to remain silent; and that the bucket and its contents 
were admissible because the chain of custody was established. 
Since appellant's contentions are without merit, the 
conviction and sentence should be af firmea. 
19 82. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of Julv, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
AlJ;JeJJ~lU 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
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